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Directed Technical Change and Climate Policy 
Summary 
This paper studies the cost effectiveness of climate policy if there are technology 
externalities. For this purpose, we develop a forward-looking CGE model that captures 
empirical links between CO2 emissions associated with energy use, directed technical 
change and the economy. We find the cost-effective climate policy to include a 
combination of R&D subsidies and CO2 emission constraints, although R&D subsidies 
raise the shadow value of the CO2 constraint (i.e.  CO2 price) because of a strong 
rebound effect from stimulating innovation. Furthermore, we find that CO2 constraints 
differentiated toward CO2-intensive sectors are more cost effective than constraints that 
generate uniform CO2 prices among sectors. Differentiated CO2 prices, through 
technical change and concomitant technology externalities, encourage growth in the 
non-CO2 intensive sectors and discourage growth in CO2-intensive sectors. Thus, it is 
cost effective to let the latter bear relatively more of the abatement burden. This result is 
robust to whether emission constraints, R&D subsidies or combinations of both are used 
to reduce CO2 emissions. 
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1.   Introduction 
There is an increasing consensus that growing emissions of greenhouse gases pose a serious 
threat to the world. One strategy for addressing this threat is to use environmental policy such as a 
cap and trade system to constrain emissions; the approach envisioned in the Kyoto Protocol of the 
Framework Convention on Climate Change that has entered into force and will be implemented 
in most industrial nations beginning in 2008. The use of a cap and trade system in this agreement 
was seen as a success of economic reasoning by many, because such systems are widely heralded 
as generating a given level of abatement in the most “cost-effective” manner. The Bush 
Administration has taken the United States out of the Kyoto Protocol and instead adopted a 
technology policy that includes support for R&D as an alternative strategy, with the idea that 
without technological options to reduce greenhouse gases an emission constraint will mostly 
punish the economy by slowing economic growth. While such a punishment seems mostly 
exaggerated for “small” reductions in emissions the ultimate goal of the Framework Convention, 
stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations, requires that the world economy reduces 
emissions by 90 to 95% from best projections of where it otherwise would be. This is untested 
territory, and thus the need for new technology is real if these stabilization goals are to be met. 
However, even recognizing that new technology is needed, one might believe that appropriate 
environmental policy instruments—the right emissions constraint or tax—would induce new 
technologies.   
We study the cost effectiveness of these different strategies. If emissions are priced will that 
induce technical change? Can R&D subsidies achieve emission reductions, and is this strategy 
cheaper than using emission constraints? Are the two strategies complementary? Can one 
improve on uniform emission-reduction policy by differentiating policy toward relatively dirty 
technologies? Previous investigations of the two strategies include Jaffe et al. (2005) and the 
general equilibrium analyses of Goulder and Schneider (1999) and Popp (2004), who show that 
carbon taxes are cost effective when they are complemented by a R&D subsidy. In a cost-
minimization setting, Rosendahl (2004)  and Bramoullé and Olson (2005)  demonstrate 
theoretically that technology externalities call for differentiation of pollution taxes. We proceed 
by empirically studying these different strategies in which we pay specific attention to their 
differentiation.  
For this purpose, we develop a forward-looking computable general equilibrium (CGE) 
model that captures empirical links between CO2 emissions associated with energy use, directed 
technical change and the economy. We draw on endogenous growth models of Rivera-Batiz and 
Romer (1991) and Acemoglu (2002) and specify technologies as stocks of knowledge capital that   3
are sector-specific investment goods, which have associated positive externalities. We calibrate 
the model to the Dutch economy, where availability of investment data for knowledge capital that 
is consistent with the national accounting framework allows us to pay special attention to its 
representation in the benchmark data. Simulations are constructed to reveal cost effective 
combinations of CO2 constraints and R&D subsidies, including the desirability of differentiating 
these instruments among clean and dirty sectors.  
 
 
2.   Basic features of the model 
This section describes the key specifications of our model. We offer a full description of the 
model in Appendix A.  
 
Model specifications 
We specify a representative consumer and producers in the following sectors: agriculture (AGR), 
CO2-intensive industry (IND), non-CO2 intensive industry and services (SER), trade and transport 
(TT), energy (NRG), CO2-intensive electricity (CIE) and non-CO2 intensive electricity (NCIE), 
where the energy sector comprises the oil- and gas industries. Agents behave rationally and have 
perfect foresight. A representative consumer maximizes intertemporal utility subject to the 
intertemporal budget constraint. Intertemporal utility is a function of the discounted sum of 
consumption over the time horizon. Environmental quality does not enter the utility function, 
implying independence of the demand functions for goods with respect to environmental quality. 
Producers maximize profits over time subject to their production-possibility frontier, which 
are determined by nested constant-elasticity-of-substitution (CES) functions of knowledge 
capital, physical capital, labor, and intermediate inputs. In addition, imported coal is used in the 
production of CO2-intensive goods and electricity. Intermediate usage of oil, gas, and coal entail 
CO2 emissions, which might be subject to quantity constraints, i.e. cap and trade systems. 
Technical change is characterized by innovation possibility frontiers, which describe 
investment in knowledge capital in the sectors. Knowledge capital is sector specific (c.f. Basu and 
Weil, 1998). Further, technical change is a deterministic process and aggregate innovation 
possibility frontiers are continuous, which allows us to avoid problems due to uncertainty or 
integer variables.
1 Investments in knowledge capital merely involve final goods as input. In 
addition, there is positive delayed feedback in technical change in that previous investments in 
                                                 
1 Even though indivisibility of knowledge capital and uncertainty related to R&D processes are facts of life, averaging 
out makes these facts matter less at aggregate levels (Romer, 1990).   4
knowledge capital have a positive external effect on the efficiency of current investments, i.e. 
learning-by-researching (henceforth referred to as positive feedback).
2 We specify this positive 
feedback operating within each sector only but relax this assumption in the sensitivity analysis. 
Finally, knowledge-capital investments accumulate into stocks, which gives rise to an additional 
technology externality on sector production. The rationale for this externality is that, while 
producers can prevent others from using their knowledge capital by means of patent protection, 
they cannot completely prevent knowledge embodied in patents from spilling over to other 
producers in their sector. These two types of technology externalities lead to the result that profit 
maximizing firms underinvest in R&D and thus there exists a rationale to subsidize investments 
in knowledge capital (henceforth referred to as R&D subsidies). 
Regarding international trade, domestically produced goods and physical capital are allocated 
between domestic and export markets. Goods traded on domestic markets are combined with 
imported goods into an Armington (1969) aggregate, which satisfies demand for intermediate- 
and final goods. An exception is coal imports, which are directly used in certain CO2-intensive 
industries and the CO2-intensive electricity sector. Domestic investment in physical capital is 
combined with foreign investment into an Armington aggregate as well, satisfying investment 
demand for physical capital. We do not model international trade in knowledge capital. As a 
small open economy, it is potentially easy for the Netherlands to meet CO2-emission constraints 
by specializing in non-CO2 intensive sectors so that the implied emissions occur outside the 
economy. While that might be a realistic response for a small economy independently pursuing a 
CO2 reduction policy, if it succeeds only by increasing emissions elsewhere there is little or no 
real climate benefit. The Armington specification, as opposed to a Heckscher-Ohlin formulation, 
closes international trade in a way that limits this leakage effect.  
 
Equilibrium and growth 
Each agent solves its optimization problem. When markets clear at all points in time, the output, 
price and income paths constitute an equilibrium. Markets for production factors and final goods 
are perfectly competitive but there initially is no market for CO2 emissions associated with energy 
use. The technology externalities support nonconvexities in the possibility frontiers and cause 
private and social returns to knowledge capital to diverge.  
Economic growth reflects the growth rates of the labor supply and stocks of physical and 
knowledge capital. Growth of the labor supply is exogenous and constant over time. Growth rates 
                                                 
2 Rivera-Batiz and Romer (1991) dub this specification ‘knowledge-based’ in contrast to the former specification, 
which they dub ‘lab-equipment’ for its emphasis on physical inputs.   5
of both capital stocks stem from endogenous saving and investment behavior. The economy 
achieves balanced growth over time with the stocks of physical and knowledge capital growing at 




In this section, we describe the calibration of our model in which we pay special attention to the 
accounting of knowledge capital. Accounting for knowledge capital in CGE models is relatively 
new and, when undertaken, is typically done in a rudimentary fashion because of absence of 
detailed information. Because of the availability of investment data for knowledge capital in The 
Netherlands that is consistent with the national accounting framework, we calibrate our model to 
the Dutch economy. We choose 1999 as the benchmark year.  
 
Accounting for knowledge capital 
To account for knowledge capital, we identify and capitalize flows associated with knowledge 
and subsequently incorporate these in the national accounting matrix (Statistics Netherlands, 
2000). We follow De Haan and Rooijen-Horsten (2004) and identify expenditures on R&D, 
expenditures on education (EDU) and investments in information- and communication 
infrastructure (ICT) as knowledge flows.
3 ICT is included because of its role in disseminating and 
storing knowledge and is therefore an important part of the infrastructure required for knowledge 
capital to be productive.  
To capitalize these knowledge flows, we take the following two steps. First, we create an 
additional (column) account registering investments in the stock of knowledge capital and an 
additional (row) account registering services derived from the stock. Investment in ICT is 
reported as investment and expenditures on R&D and education are reported as derived services. 
We assume the Dutch economy to be on a balanced growth path in 1999, which implies a fixed 
relation between investments in and services derived from the sector-specific stocks of 
knowledge capital. This relation gives us the total column and row accounts for knowledge 
capital as a result of the three knowledge flows. Second, we debit the national accounting matrix 
to avoid double counting. Given that investments in ICT are originally reported as investments in 
                                                 
3 We are aware that this identification entails to a certain degree unavoidable randomness. There are many types of 
knowledge and knowledge may be embedded not only in software and books but also in e.g. people and traditions. It 
therefore is difficult to comprehensively measure and aggregate knowledge. Yet, it is not altogether different from 
aggregating physical capital goods. The main difference is, of course, that it is difficult to attach a value to knowledge 
capital (Griliches, 1979).   6
physical capital, we debit the investment (column) account with the amounts of investment in 
ICT. Expenditures on R&D and education are originally reported as intermediate consumption 
requiring us to debit the intermediate goods matrix. We follow Terleckyj (1974) and assume that 
knowledge is embodied in tangible goods and services, which allows us to debit each sector’s 
expenditures on education and R&D from the sector’s consumption of intermediate goods 
proportionally to its sector of origin. We balance the national accounting matrix by adjusting the 
(row) account for labor.  
 
Data and parameter values     
Besides accounting for knowledge capital, we make further data adjustments to account for CO2 
emissions associated with energy use. We divide the electricity sector into CO2-intensive and 
non-CO2-intensive electricity generation using techno-economic data for the key technologies 
that are sufficient to give an appropriate representation for both types of electricity generation 
(Böhringer, et al., 2003). Table B.1 presents cost structures and market shares of the electricity 
generation technologies in The Netherlands. Further, we obtain data on fossil-fuel inputs in The 
Netherlands from the GTAP-EG database (Paltsev and Rutherford, 2000) and match this data 
with CO2 emission data for The Netherlands (Koch, et al., 2002). We classify CO2-intensive 
industry, trade and transport, energy and CO2-intensive electricity as CO2-intensive sectors and 
agriculture, non-CO2 intensive industry and services and non-CO2 intensive electricity as non-
CO2 intensive sectors. Table B.2 presents the national accounting matrix and Table B.3 reports 
factor- and CO2 intensities. 
Turning to model parameters, we use general parameter values that are standard in the 
literature (see Tables A5-6). Regarding international trade, however, we assume unitary 
substitution elasticity between domestic and foreign commodities, which is lower than is often 
used. This limits the leakage effect discussed above. Many of the largest trading partners of The 
Netherlands are implementing similar environmental policies, such as the EU emissions trading 
scheme, which limits effects of international trade on relative factor shares. Regarding 
technology-related parameters, we use a 25 percent depreciation rate for knowledge capital.
4 
Pakes and Schankerman (1979) study patent renewals in the United Kingdom, Germany, France, 
The Netherlands and Switzerland and find a point estimate for the depreciation rate of 25 percent 
with a confidence interval between 18 and 35 percent. This estimate is consistent with data on 
                                                 
4 Alternatively, one can take the view that knowledge doesn’t depreciate at all. This assumption is likely to be valid if 
the sector or industry under study is narrowly defined and its stock of knowledge capital changes only slowly 
(Griliches, 1988). This assumption is less likely to be valid, however, if one defines sectors more broadly or for periods 
where one might suspect more rapid obsolescence of knowledge capital such as the decades following the ICT boom.    7
lifespans of applied R&D expenditures, which suggests an average service life of four to five 
years. More recently, Jorgenson and Stiroh (2000) have estimated a geometric depreciation rate 
for computer equipment and software of 31.5 percent. Further, we assume a positive feedback 
effect in technical change of 20 percent being the difference between the private- and social 
returns to knowledge capital. The former is at least equal to the 25-percent depreciation rate 
whereas estimates of the latter lie in the range of 30-60 percent (see e.g. Baumol, 2002, or Otto et 
al., 2006, who find a positive feedback effect of 45 percent with delays up till eight years). We 
base the coefficient value for the knowledge spillovers on Coe and Helpman (1995) who estimate 
the elasticity of R&D stocks on total factor productivity at 9 percent for non-G7 OECD countries.  
Finally, we consider a 27-year time horizon, defined over the years 1999 through 2025, and 
calibrate the model to a balanced growth path of two percent, which serves as reference case in 




We analyze cost-effectiveness of both environmental- and technology policy to reduce 
cumulative CO2 emissions in production over the time horizon of the model by 10 percent 
relative to the reference case, where we differentiate both policies between CO2-intensive and 
non-CO2-intensive sectors. Environmental policy takes the form of quantity constraints for CO2 
emissions (i.e. cap and trade systems) and technology policy takes the form of R&D subsidies. To 
avoid leakage of CO2 emissions to consumption in all simulations, we also reduce these emissions 
by 10 percent relative to the reference case using a separate quantity constraint. 
 
Simulation 1: Differentiated CO2-emission constraints 
Figure 1 shows effects of the various possibilities to differentiate the CO2 emission constraint 
between CO2-intensive and non-CO2-intensive sectors on shadow prices of CO2 emissions in the 
sectors (lower graph) and discounted utility (upper graph). We explain this figure in several steps, 
starting with the horizontal axes that list percentage changes in CO2 emissions of the non-CO2-
intensive sectors. As a first step, we set these percentage changes exogenously and calculate the 
CO2-emission constraint for the CO2-intensive sectors necessary for total emissions in production 
to be reduced by 10 percent. Second, we use the model to calculate the general equilibrium result 
associated with each differentiation of both CO2 emission constraints. The lower graph maps the 
corresponding sets of shadow prices for CO2 emissions required to meet the sectoral emission 
constraints. In general, technology externalities positively affect the shadow prices. In this   8
simulation, however, we find the shadow prices with technology externalities to exhibit negligible 
differences from those without technology externalities.
5 For this reason, we present only one 
curve for each sector in this graph. Yet, the technology externalities have a noticeable effect on 
welfare. As a last step, therefore, we map the changes to discounted utility that correspond with 
each differentiation of the CO2 emission constraints in the upper graph. Utility indices smaller 
than one imply welfare losses relative to the reference case. The upper curve shows the welfare 
loss if there are technology externalities whereas the lower curve shows the welfare loss if there 
are none. The left dashed vertical line represents the set of uniform shadow prices, which is the 
cost-effective (highest welfare) set if there are no technology externalities. The right dashed 
vertical line represents the set of differentiated shadow prices, which is the cost-effective set if 
there are technology externalities.  
 
Insert Figure 1 here 
 
We find that the conventional result of uniform shadow prices across sectors being cost 
effective holds if there are no technology externalities. The 10 percent emission reduction in 
production entails a welfare loss of 0.30 percent over the time period and results in a shadow 
price of €2.70 per ton CO2 in all sectors. When there are technology externalities, however, we 
find that welfare is higher for all differentiations of the CO2 emission constraints. If the 
constraints can be set at different levels, we find it cost effective to differentiate the constraints 
toward the CO2-intensive sectors. The 10 percent emission reduction in production now entails a 
welfare loss of 0.28 percent over the time period and results in shadow prices of €2.80 per ton 
CO2 in the CO2-intensive sectors and €0.10 per ton CO2 in the non-CO2-intensive sectors. CO2 
emission constraints direct technical change toward non-CO2 intensive sectors yielding relatively 
more technology externalities in these sectors and therefore raising their opportunity cost of 
abatement. The electricity sector, for example, redirects its R&D toward biomass and wind 
technologies resulting in relatively more knowledge spilling over from the development of these 
technologies than fossil-fuel electricity technologies. Thus, it is cheaper to shift some abatement 
toward CO2-intensive technologies and sectors.  
The bias in technical change can be best understood with help of the general framework 
presented by Acemoglu (2002) or the framework applied to energy biased technical change of 
                                                 
5 The difference between shadow prices with and without technology externalities is difficult to graphically detect in 
this simulation. Technology externalities have a positive effect on the shadow price of CO2 emissions because of their 
positive effect on welfare and hence overall demand for energy and concomitant CO2 emissions. Yet, this effect is 
limited in this simulation because of the deadweight losses associated to the CO2 emission constraints.   9
Otto et al. (2005). On the supply side of the economy, CO2-emission constraints give rise to a 
substitution effect in production in that knowledge capital substitutes for fossil fuels raising the 
profitability of investing in knowledge capital in the CO2-intensive sectors. On the demand side, 
however, CO2-emission constraints give rise to a substitution effect in consumption as consumers 
shift toward non-CO2-intensive goods raising the profitability of investing in knowledge capital in 
the non-CO2-intensive sectors. When introducing CO2 emission constraints, we find the demand 
side to be relatively important as substitution in consumption is necessary for cost-effective 
emission reduction. Technology externalities reinforce the bias.  
 
Simulation 2: Differentiated R&D subsidies 
We now study R&D subsidies as our instrument to reduce overall CO2 emissions in production 
by 10 percent relative to the reference case. Figure 2 shows effects of the various possibilities to 
differentiate the CO2 emission reduction between CO2-intensive and non-CO2-intensive sectors 
on required R&D subsidies (lower graph) and discounted utility (upper graph). We obtain Figure 
2 in a similar fashion as Figure 1 except that we now compute R&D subsidy rates instead of 
shadow prices of CO2 emissions in general equilibrium. Finally, the left dashed vertical line 
represents the set of uniform R&D subsidies and the right dashed vertical line represents the set 
of differentiated R&D subsidies. 
Insert Figure 2 here 
 
We find that R&D subsidies can also achieve the 10 percent emission reduction in 
production. In fact, differentiating R&D subsidies toward non-CO2 intensive sectors not only can 
reduce emissions but also increases welfare compared to the reference case. Table 1 shows that 
compared to the hypothetical reference case, however, using R&D subsidies to achieve the 
emission reduction always entails a welfare loss as R&D subsidies are a first-best instrument to 
internalize technology externalities but a second-best instrument to reduce emissions. 
 
Insert Table 1 here 
 
The cost-effective set of R&D subsidies yields a welfare gain of 11.3 percent over the time 
period and comprises an R&D subsidy of 48 percent in the non-CO2-intensive sectors and an 
R&D  tax of 50 percent in the CO2-intensive sectors. Although the introduction of an R&D 
subsidy in the non-CO2-intensive sectors has a negative effect on CO2 emissions because of 
substitution effects in production and consumption, the R&D subsidy also gives rise to a strong   10
rebound effect that offsets the substitution effects. As the R&D subsidy lowers the marginal costs 
of non-CO2-intensive goods, it indirectly increases demand for these goods and the concomitant 
demand for energy and CO2 emissions. More importantly, by internalizing some of the 
technology externalities as well, the R&D subsidy increases welfare leading to an overall higher 
demand for energy and CO2 emissions that strengthens the rebound effect. If R&D subsidies are 
the sole instruments of choice, an R&D tax in CO2-intensive sectors is thus preferred in the cost-
effective solution to keep overall emissions within bounds.
6 Essentially, the policy is one of 
supporting growth of non-CO2 intensive sectors while slowing it in CO2-intensive sectors. 
Introducing R&D subsidies in all sectors is feasible albeit cost ineffective in achieving the 
emission reduction.  
 
Simulation 3: Combinations of differentiated CO2-emission constraints and differentiated R&D 
subsidies 
We next study combinations of CO2 emission constraints and R&D subsidies as our instruments 
to abate CO2 emissions in production by 10 percent relative to the reference case. For this 
purpose, we augment the first simulation by introducing combinations of differentiated R&D 
subsidies before computing the general equilibrium associated with each differentiation of the 
CO2 emission constraints. This way we can identify both the cost-effective set of differentiated 
CO2 emission constraints and the efficient set of differentiated R&D subsidies. Figure 3 shows 
effects of the various possibilities to differentiate the CO2 emission constraint between CO2-
intensive- and non-CO2-intensive sectors on shadow prices of CO2 emissions in the sectors (lower 
graph) and discounted utility (upper graph) when the efficient set of R&D subsidies is introduced 
next to the CO2-emission constraints.  
 
Insert Figure 3 here 
 
Emission reduction is cost effective if R&D subsidies complement rather than substitute for 
CO2 emission constraints. The cost-effective set of instruments yields a welfare gain of 27.1 
percent over the time period and comprises R&D subsidies of 62 percent and 53 percent in the 
CO2-intensive and non-CO2-intensive sectors as well as shadow prices of €18.60 and €9.30 per 
ton CO2 in the respective sectors. Of course, the emission reduction still comes at a cost when 
compared to the hypothetical reference case in which we would already correct for the technology 
                                                 
6 This finding is in line with other studies. Popp (2004), for example, finds that subsidizing energy R&D yields 
significant increases in energy technology but nevertheless has little effect on CO2 emissions.   11
externalities (see Table 1). Compared with this hypothetical case, welfare falls by 1.25 percent 
over the time period, which is significantly more than the 0.28 percent welfare loss in the case 
where we do not yet make such a correction (see the first simulation). The CO2 emission 
constraints are more binding when the technology externalities are already corrected and hence 
they entail a bigger deadweight loss.  
Regarding differentiation of the policy instruments, we find that continued differentiation 
remains a feature of the cost-effective policy in this simulation because of interacting policy 
effects. The CO2 emission constraints are principally introduced to reduce emissions but also 
induce technical change and concomitant technology externalities. Similarly, R&D subsidies 
correct for the technology externalities but at the same time affect CO2 emissions. The R&D 
subsidies are now differentiated toward CO2-intensive sectors, as they are in the hypothetical 
reference case in which we just correct technology externalities without regard for emission 
reduction, and subsequently direct technical change toward these sectors. CO2 shadow prices 
remain differentiated in this simulation as technology externalities, and hence the opportunity 
costs of abatement, remain higher in non-CO2 intensive sectors because of their initial size and 
knowledge intensity. Compared to the first simulation though, the difference in shadow prices 
narrows while shadow prices increase in magnitude because of the CO2-emission constraints 
being more binding.      
 
Macro-economic effects 
Table 2 shows that the three simulations have different macro-economic effects besides having 
different welfare implications. Contracted growth characterizes the first simulation with CO2 
emission constraints. Total output growth is negative relative to the reference case, where CO2-
intensive sectors decrease their production relatively more as they are subject to the more 
stringent CO2-trading scheme. Exceptions are non-CO2 intensive industries and services and non-
CO2 intensive electricity, which slightly increase their production.  With respect to inputs to 
production, the factor substitution effect in production increases marginal returns to factors other 
than energy, where the marginal return to physical capital increases to the extent that investments 
in physical capital actually increase slightly relative to the reference case. Foreign investment 
changes accordingly. International trade in goods falls proportionally to domestic trade as we 
assume trading partners of The Netherlands to introduce similar CO2 emissions abatement 
policies. Biased growth characterizes the second simulation with R&D subsidies. By using R&D 
subsidies in non-CO2 intensive sectors and R&D taxes in CO2-intensive sectors, one speeds up 
growth in the former while slowing it in the latter. The production structure, for example, shifts   12
markedly from CO2-intensive to non-CO2-intensive goods. Although increased welfare and 
limited substitution possibilities in the economy lessen the negative impact for the CO2-intensive 
sectors for the first half of the model horizon, these sectors are hit hard afterwards when more 
substitution has been taking place and path dependency in technical change is strong. Further, 
more physical capital is required to expand the non-CO2-intensive sectors and as a result 
investments in physical capital increase. Foreign investments change accordingly. Finally, more 
goods are now imported and fewer goods exported. Enhanced growth characterizes the third 
simulation with both CO2 emission constraints and R&D subsidies. Because of the introduction of 
R&D subsidies in all sectors, total factor productivity and hence production levels increase 
throughout the economy relative to the reference case. As a result, demand for production factors 
increases as is reflected in, among others, increased investment in physical capital. Foreign 
investments and international trade in goods change accordingly.  
 
Insert Table 2 here  
 
Sensitivity analysis 
Table 3 reports the sensitivity of our results to key parameter values. We use central parameter 
values in all sensitivity simulations (see Tables A.5-6) except for the parameter subject to 
analysis. Given the importance of technical change for our findings, we focus on technology 
parameters, which simultaneously are a good proxy for the knowledge-capital accounting. Effects 
are reported as index values compared to the regular simulations.  
 
Insert Table 3 here  
 
The general result from Table 5.4 is that our findings are robust to the range of parameter 
values considered. The cost-effective set of instruments still includes R&D subsidies as 
complements to, rather than substitutes for, CO2-trading schemes while the cost-effective 
differentiation remains unchanged (no index value changes sign).  
Turning to the specific parameters subject to analysis, lowering the depreciation rate of 
knowledge capital (
H δ ) by 25 percent has a negative effect on intertemporal utility in all 
simulations as fewer investments in knowledge capital are required yielding less positive 
feedback in TC.
7 The overall decrease of technology externalities reduces the relative opportunity 
                                                 
7 At the same time, lower depreciation rates lead to bigger stocks of knowledge capital yielding more knowledge spillovers. This 
positive welfare effect, however, is outweighed by the negative welfare effect of less positive feedback in technical change.   13
cost of CO2 abatement in the non-CO2 intensive sectors and hence the cost-effective 
differentiation of the CO2-trading schemes in the first and third simulation. In the second 
simulation, the gap between R&D subsidies widens as R&D subsidy rates fall relatively more in 
non-CO2 intensive sectors. Bigger stocks of knowledge capital enhance total factor productivity 
and the rebound effect, ceteris paribus. It therefore is cost effective to further differentiate R&D 
subsidies to keep emissions within bounds. The opposite holds if we increase the depreciation 
rate of knowledge capital by 25 percent.  
Lowering the positive-feedback effect in TC (ξ ) by 25 percent has a negative effect on 
intertemporal utility in all simulations as fewer technology externalities are enjoyed. The decrease 
of technology externalities reduces the relative opportunity cost of CO2 abatement in non-CO2 
intensive sectors and hence the cost-effective differentiation of R&D subsidies in the second 
simulation and of CO2-trading schemes in the third simulation. As R&D subsidies fall relatively 
more in non-CO2 intensive sectors in the third simulation, the gap between R&D subsidies 
widens. The opposite holds if we increase the positive-feedback effect by 25 percent.  
Specifying a positive feedback in TC to operate across rather than within sectors has a small 
negative effect on intertemporal utility, especially in the second simulation, as technology 
externalities in the non-CO2 intensive sectors now also benefit CO2-intensive sectors requiring a 
higher R&D tax in the latter to keep emissions within bounds. Consequently, the cost-effective 
differentiation of R&D subsidies widens in the second simulation. In the first and third 
simulations, however, the cost-effective differentiation of both policy instruments narrows as 
positive feedback benefits all sectors while the policy instruments are used for their first-best 
purpose.  
Finally, lowering the substitution elasticity between knowledge capital and other factors in 
production (
H σ ) by 25 percent has a negative effect on intertemporal utility in especially the 
second- and third simulations as substitution possibilities to adjust to the CO2 abatement are 
limited. Moreover, the limited substitution possibilities translate into lower demands for 
knowledge capital and therefore fewer technology externalities. Consequently, changes in model 




Recent interest has arisen with respect to the role of induced innovation in environmental policy, 
particularly regarding climate change. The Kyoto Protocol that many industrial countries are 
pursuing relies on a conventional cap and trade system to constrain emissions. The US has   14
withdrawn and has instead adopted technology policy as an alternative strategy with the intent of 
directing R&D to reduce CO2 emissions. The questions we addressed in this paper are: Which 
strategy is preferred from a welfare perspective or does a combination of both strategies work 
better? Can one improve on uniform emission-reduction policy by differentiating policy toward 
CO2-intensive sectors?  
To answer these questions, we developed a forward-looking computable general equilibrium 
model that captures empirical links between CO2 emissions associated with energy use, directed 
technical change and the economy. Environmental quality does not enter the utility function, 
implying independence of the demand functions for goods with respect to environmental quality. 
We specified technologies as knowledge capital, which are sector-specific investment goods and 
which empirical research has long found to cause positive technology externalities leading to 
underinvestment relative to what is socially optimal. 
At this point, it is necessary to add some policy reality to the discussion. If policies can be 
designed to correct for technology externalities the economy can gain substantially. We show this 
to be the case, such that welfare in the Dutch economy under study can be improved by nearly 30 
percent over our 27-year time span. We find that R&D subsidies that are optimally differentiated 
to achieve a 10 percent reduction in CO2 emissions improve the economy by about 11 percent 
relative to the reference case where technology externalities are not yet internalized. This appears 
to be a double-dividend world where CO2 emissions are reduced while leaving the economy 
better off. The difficulty, however, is how to design such technology policy in reality. The 
unrealized 30 percent welfare gain from the technology externalities is evidence of the difficulty 
of correcting for them. Our best past efforts, patent protection and government funded R&D, 
leave us with significant underinvestment. To realize the emission reduction requires that we 
overcome the known limits of government funding and intellectual property rights protection and 
then direct technology policy toward non-CO2-intensive sectors. Our results suggest that the 
differential policy to achieve the emission reduction needs to be very strong. Essentially, it means 
creating disincentives for R&D in CO2-intensive sectors causing them to wither away, and 
creating large subsidies for non-CO2-intensive sectors, accelerating their growth. If it is possible 
to ideally correct for the technology externalities, we find that the preferred policy is to do so in 
combination with CO2 emission constraints, i.e. cap and trade systems. These constraints are 
costly to the economy relative to the case where technology externalities are corrected for without 
reducing emissions, but a combination is much preferred to R&D subsidies alone or emission 
constraints alone.     15
Regardless of the particular instruments chosen, we find that technology externalities call for 
differentiation of instruments between non-CO2-intensive and CO2-intensive sectors, such that the 
latter bear relatively more of the abatement burden. Essentially such differentiation partly corrects 
for the CO2 implications of the technology externalities. The welfare gain for differentiated 
emission constraints is relatively small compared with uniform constraints. The gain is large for 
the differentiation of R&D subsidies; in fact, uniform R&D subsidies are negative in all sectors, 
essentially slowing economic growth to achieve the emission reduction with highly negative 
welfare effects relative to the reference case or the cases involving emission constraints. 
Thus, is a true double dividend possible? In principle differentiated R&D subsidies with or 
without CO2 emission constraints lead to that result, relative to the reference case. However, if we 
can design such precise incentives for R&D we might as well compare our situation to a reference 
case where technology externalities are already corrected without regard to emission reduction. 
Compared to the “R&D corrected” reference case, emission constraints entail a larger welfare 
loss than does the “emission constraints only case” relative to the reference case where 
technology externalities are not yet corrected. So, the answer depends in part on perspective and 
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Appendix A.  Structure and parameter values of the model 
This appendix provides an algebraic summary of the model. We formulate the model as a mixed-
complementarity problem using the Mathematical Programming System for General Equilibrium 
Analysis (Rutherford, 1999), which is a subsystem of the General Algebraic Modeling System 
(Ferris and Munson, 2000). In this approach, three classes of equilibrium conditions characterize 
an economic equilibrium: zero-profit conditions for production activities, market clearance 
conditions for each primary factor and good, and an income definition for the representative 
consumer. The fundamental unknowns of the system are activity levels, market prices, and the 
income level. The zero profit conditions exhibit complementary slackness with respect to associated 
activity levels, the market clearance conditions with respect to market prices, and the income 
definition equation with respect to the income of the representative consumer. The notation 
z Π  
denotes the zero profit condition for activity z and the orthogonality symbol ⊥  associates 
variables with complementary slackness conditions. For the sake of transparency, we use the 
acronyms CES (constant elasticity of substitution), CD (Cobb Douglas), and LT (Leontief) to 
indicate functional form. Differentiating profit and expenditure functions with respect to input 
and output prices provides compensated demand and supply coefficients (Hotelling’s lemma), 
which appear subsequently in the market clearance conditions. An equilibrium allocation 
determines production levels, relative prices, and incomes. We choose the price of intertemporal 
utility as numeraire and report all prices in present values. Tables A.1 through A.6 list the 
nomenclature. 
 
A.1.  Zero profit conditions 
Production of goods: 
( ) , ,, , ,  ,; 0
YH K L E M H




Π≡ − ≥  , it Y ⊥   1,.., iI = ;  1,.., tT =   (A.1)
where 
( ) ( ) ,, , ,, ; ;
KLEM A KE KLE KLEM
it it it t i i p CES p CES p w σσ =     
( ) ( ) ,, ,, ; ;
KE K EL FF E KE
it t t it i i p CES r CES p p σσ =     
( ) ,, ,
FF EM
i t NRG t NCI pL T pp =   , iA G R S E R =    
( ) ,, ,
FF EM
i t NRG t CI pL T pp =   , iT T N R G =    
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( ) ( ) ( ) ,, ,, ,;
FFE M C O A L E M F F
i t NRG t CI t CI i p CES LT p p LT p p σ =   , iC I I C I E =    
 
Aggregate production of electricity:  
( ) , ;0
EL EL EL
ti t t CES p p σ Π≡ − ≥   t EL ⊥   iE L ∈ ;  1,.., tT =   (A.2)
 
Investments in knowledge capital: 
() ,1 ,, , 1  10
Rc H
it it it it Rp s p
ξ −
− + Π≡ − − =  , it R ⊥   ic ∈ ;  1,.., 1 tT = −   (A.3)
() ,1 ,,  10
Rc T H
iT iT iT i Rp sp
ξ −
− Π≡ − − =   , iT R ⊥   ic ∈    
 
Stock of knowledge capital: 
() ,, , 1 1
HH H H
it it it p rp δ + =+ −   , it H ⊥   1,.., iI = ;  1,.., 1 tT =−   (A.4)
,,
H HT H
iT iT i p rp =+   , iT H ⊥   1,.., iI =    
 
Investments in physical capital:  
( ) () ,1 ,, ; 0
IK F D I A K
ti t t t t CD p CES r p p σ + Π≡ − =   t I ⊥   1,.., 1 tT = −   (A.5)
( ) ( ) , ,, ; 0
IK F D I A T K
Ti T T T CD p CES r p p σ Π≡ − =  T I ⊥     
 
Stock of physical capital:  
() 1 1
K KK K
tt t p rp δ + =+ −   t K ⊥   1,.., 1 tT = −   (A.6)
K KT K
TT p rp =+   T K ⊥     
 
Armington aggregate:  
() () ,, , , ,; ; 0
AI M M A A
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Imports of goods:  
, 0
Y IM FX IM
it t t pp Π≡ − ≥   ,
Y
it IM ⊥   1,.., iI = ;  1,.., tT =   (A.8)
 
Imports of coal: 
0
COAL IM FX COAL
tt t pP Π≡ − ≥  
COAL
t IM ⊥ 1,.., tT =   (A.9)
 
Foreign direct investment: 
0
FDI FX FDI
tt t pp Π≡ − ≥   t FDI ⊥   1,.., tT =   (A.10)
 
Exports of goods: 
() , ,0
Y EX EL FX
tt i t t CD p p p Π≡ − ≥  
Y
t EX ⊥   iE L ∉ ;  1,.., tT =   (A.11)
 
Exports of physical capital: 
0
K EX K FX
tt t rp Π≡− ≥  
K
t EX ⊥   1,.., tT =   (A.12)
  
Intratemporal utility: 
( ) ( ) , ,, ; ; 0
WF X E Y E A W
tt j t t Wt CES p CES p p p σσ Π≡ − ≥ t W ⊥   j E ∉ ;  1,.., tT =   (A.13)
where 
() () , ,, ;
EE L E M E





t CES p p ρ Π≡ − =  U ⊥    (A.14)
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Knowledge capital (in stock): 
,1 0 it i HH = =   ,1
H
it p = ⊥   1,.., iI =   (A.18)
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Physical capital (in market): 
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Physical capital (in stock):  
10 t KK = =   1
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t p = ⊥    (A.20)
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A.4. Endowments 
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A.5. Constraints 
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Table A.1: Sets and indices 
i  ,, ,, ,, AGR IND TT SER NRG CIE NCIE  Sectors and goods (aliased with j) 
E   ,, NRG CIE NCIE   Energy (sectors) 
EL  , CIE NCIE   Electricity (sectors) 
FF   , COAL NRG   Fossil fuel (sectors) 
c  :, , ,
:, ,
CI IND TT NRG CIE
NCI AGR SER NCIE
 
Sectors according to CO2 intensity 
t  1,..,T   Time periods 
 
Table A.2: Activity variables 
, it Y   Production of goods in sector i at time t 
t EL   Aggregate production of electricity at time t 
, it H   Stock of knowledge capital in sector i at time t 
, it H   Knowledge spillover applied to sector i at time t 
i TH   Terminal stock of knowledge capital in sector i  
, it R   Investments in knowledge capital in sector i at time t 
, it R   Feedback in technical change applied to sector i at time t 
t K   Stock of physical capital at time t 
TK   Terminal stock of physical capital 
t I   Investments in physical capital at time t 
, it A   Armington aggregate of domestic- and foreign intermediate goods in sector i at time t 
,
Y
it IM   Aggregate imports of goods in sector i at time t 
COAL
t IM   Aggregate imports of coal at time t   26
t FDI   Foreign direct investment at time t 
Y
t EX   Aggregate exports of goods at time t 
K
t EX   Aggregate exports of physical capital at time t 
t W   Intratemporal utility at time t 
U   Intertemporal utility 
 
Table A.3: Income- and endowment variables 
B   Budget of the representative agent 
0 BOP   Initial Balance of Payments of the domestic representative agent  
t BOP   Balance of Payments of the domestic representative agent at time t 
0i H   Initial stock of knowledge capital in sector i  
0 K   Initial stock of physical capital  
0 L   Initial endowment of labor 
t L   Endowment of labor at time t 
0 EM   Initial allowances of CO2 emissions 
EM   Overall allowances of CO2 emissions 
 
 
Table A.4: Price variables (in present values) 
p   Prices 
FX
t p   Price of foreign exchange at time t 
EM p   Shadow prices of CO2 emissions 
c s   Subsidy on investments in knowledge capital in sectors c  
t r   Rental rate of capital at time t 
t w   Wage rate at time t 
   27
 
Table A.5: Parameters 
Description  Value 
a   Abatement of CO2 emissions   0.10 
γ   Knowledge spillover coefficient  0.09 
ξ   Coefficient of positive feedback in technical change   0.20 
g   Growth rate  0.02 
r   Interest rate  0.05 
K δ   Depreciation rate of physical capital  0.05 
H δ   Depreciation rate of knowledge capital  0.25 
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Table A.6: Elasticities  
Description  Value 
Elasticity of substitution in intertemporal utility   
ρ   Between time periods  0.5 
Elasticities of substitution in intratemporal utility   
YE
W σ   Between energy and other goods   0.5 
E
W σ   Between electricity and fossil fuels  0.7 
Elasticities of substitution in international trade   
A σ   Between domestic and foreign commodities  1.0 
Elasticities of substitution in aggregate electricity production   
EL σ   Between CO2-intensive and non-CO2 intensive electricity   2.5 
     
Elasticities of substitution in production sector  AGR  IND  TT  SER  NRG  CIE  NCIE 
H σ   Between knowledge capital and 
remaining inputs 
1.0  1.0  1.0  1.0  1.0  1.0  1.0 
KLEM
i σ   Between intermediate inputs and 
remaining inputs 
0.4 0.5 0.7 0.7 0.9 0.1 0.1 
M
i σ   Between intermediate inputs   0.1 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.1 0.1 
KLE
i σ   Between labor and remaining inputs 0.3 0.2 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.1 0.1 
KE
i σ   Between physical capital and energy   0.7  0.7  0.7  0.7  0.1  0.7  0.7 
E
i σ   Between electricity and fossil fuels  0.5  0.5  0.5  0.5  0.1  0.5   
FF
i σ   Between fossil fuels  0.9  0.9  0.9  0.9  0.1  0.5   
Notes: The substitution elasticities in utility are assumed. The substitution elasticity in intertemporal utility lies between 
smaller values typically found in time-series studies (e.g. Hall, (1988) and larger values typically found in studies that also 
exploit cross-sectional data (e.g. Beaudry and Wincoop, 1996). The substitution elasticity in international trade is lower than 
usual to reflect introduction of similar CO2 emission reduction policies by most of the trading partners of The Netherlands. 
We obtain the substitution elasticities in production from the TaxInc model (Statistics Netherlands, 1990), except for the 
substitution elasticity between knowledge capital and remaining inputs, which we obtain from Goulder and Schneider (1999), 
and except the substitution elasticity in aggregate electricity production, which is assumed. 
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Appendix B.  Data  
 
 
Table B.1: Cost- and market shares of electricity technologies (%) 
 Cost  shares  Market 
share 
 Physical 
Capital  Labor Energy  Intermediate 
inputs  Total  
CO2  intensive          
  Natural-gas fired  24.9    5.6  62.2    7.3  100.0  56.9 
  Hard-coal fired  38.6    5.6  23.7    9.0    76.9  25.5 
  Oil-fired  46.9    2.2  40.3  10.6  100.0   7.6 
Non-CO2  intensive          
  Biomass  18.8    6.6    58.5    83.9   4.6 
  Nuclear  59.0    5.1    17.4    81.5   4.4 
 Wind  86.4  19.8      106.2    1.0 
Source: Böhringer et al. (2003) 
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Agriculture 16.29  0.09 0.08 1.83 0.02   0.02  28.49 7.36 0.73 1.72 0.06 56.68 
CO2-intensive industry  0.87  4.92 1.43 8.63 0.14 0.05 0.07  34.66 3.96 0.28 7.31 0.01 62.31 
Trade and transport  0.54  0.65 3.14 4.09 0.25 0.01 0.02  77.38 7.06 0.51 6.87 -0.01 100.50 
Non-CO2 intensive industry 
and services  4.23  4.71 14.64 67.09 1.16 0.64 0.08  34.45 160.94 89.36 60.46 0.16 437.92 
Energy 0.99  1.08 1.50 1.23 4.31 0.83   11.42 5.38 0.07 1.07 0.08 27.97 
Electricity  0.54 0.63 0.57 0.72 0.07 3.32 0.39 2.07 2.20 0.01 0.60 0.00 11.13 
Imports 14.31  21.01 13.75 60.30 6.20 1.26     62.90 23.59   0.25 203.56 
Taxes  minus  subsidies  -0.70  0.12 -0.98 4.18 4.60 0.38 0.06        7.66 
Labor  5.97  10.90 33.23 133.54 1.34 0.76 0.09        185.84 
Physical capital  11.72  10.09 25.52 89.12 8.69 2.16 0.31  0.56 16.96 3.50     168.63 
Knowledge  capital  1.92  8.12 7.63 67.18 1.19 0.60 0.07        86.71 
      
Total 56.68  62.31 100.50 437.92 27.97 10.01 1.11  189.02 266.76 118.04 78.03 0.54  
Sources: Statistics Netherlands (2000), Böhringer et al. (2003), De Haan and Rooijen-Horsten (2004) and own calculations. 
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Table B.3: Selected factor-intensities of the Dutch economy in 1999 (% of gross sectoral product) 
   Knowledge 
capital    Physical 
capital 
Labor CO2 
Sector R&D  EDU  ICT  Total       
Production         
 CO2 intensive  3.3  4.8  0.7   8.7  23.1  23.0      0.07 
   CO2-intensive industry  8.3  4.4  0.4  13.0  16.2  17.5    0.08 
    Trade and transport  0.8  6.2  0.6   7.6  25.4   33.1    0.04 
    Energy  1.8  1.3  1.3   4.3  31.1    4.8    0.04 
   CO2-intensive electricity  1.3  2.4  2.3   6.0  21.6    7.6    0.41 
             
 Non-CO2 intensive  3.7  8.7  1.5  14.0  20.4  28.2  <0.01 
    Agriculture  1.5  1.4  0.5   3.4  20.7  10.5    0.01 
   Non-CO2 intensive 
industry and services  4.0 9.7 1.6  15.3  20.4  30.5  <0.01 
   Non-CO2 intensive 
electricity  1.3  2.4  2.3   6.0  28.3   7.8    0.00 
         
Consumption             0.01 
Note: Capital intensities are respectively services derived from knowledge- and physical capital expressed as 
percentages of gross sectoral product. CO2 intensities are CO2 emissions in Mt. expressed as percentage of gross 
sectoral product in million euros. We obtain data on knowledge capital from De Haan and Rooijen-Horsten (2004) and 
data on CO2 emissions from the GTAP-EG database (Paltsev and Rutherford, 2000) and the Emission Monitor for The 
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Table 1: Effects of policies on discounted utility (% change from original reference) 
    
  % change from 
original reference 
% change from 
hypothetical reference 
reference cases     
   original    0.00   -28.35 
   hypothetical with correction for technology externalities    28.35      0.00 
simulations    
   differentiated CO2-emission constraints    -0.28   -28.63 
   differentiated R&D subsidies to reduce CO2 emissions   11.30   -17.05 
   combinations of differentiated CO2-emission constraints 
and differentiated R&D subsidies 
 27.10     -1.25 
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Table 2: Effects of CO2-reduction policies on the Dutch economy (percentage changes) 
   Simulation 
      1      2      3  
   2005 2015 2025 2005 2015 2025 2005 2015 2025
Production Total  -0.4 -0.6 -0.9 31.0 43.8 44.8 48.1 78.9 98.4
   CO2 intensive  IND  -0.8 -1.5 -2.3 -9.6 -11.0 -29.5 85.9 133.1 161.9
    TT  -0.7 -1.3 -2.0 -10.1 -15.5 -39.8 35.3 60.3 74.2
 NRG  -3.5 -5.4 -8.2 -11.6 -9.3 -29.7 10.6 36.6 44.8
 CIE  -2.6 -4.2 -6.5 -12.1 -8.6 -16.0 36.3 47.6 36.3
   Non-CO2 intensive  AGR  -0.6 -1.1 -1.6 15.2 16.3 -15.3 18.5 56.6 80.3
 SER  0.1 0.2 0.2 51.8 73.2 88.6 52.3 78.6 101.6
 NCIE  3.1  5.0 8.1 88.4 105.5 74.5 25.4 119.7 258.0
Investments in 
knowledge capital  Total  -0.3 -0.4 -0.6 246.6 275.3 310.3 346.7 510.4 625.2
   CO2 intensive  IND  -1.0 -1.7 -2.5 -44.0 -49.5 -59.1 632.5 935.5 1156.4
    TT  -0.9 -1.6 -2.3 -43.1 -53.7 -66.7 355.9 535.9 628.3
 NRG  -4.1 -6.3 -9.0 -47.2 -48.6 -59.8 208.2 418.8 481.0
 CIE  -2.7 -4.2 -6.2 -48.3 -45.6 -48.8 361.3 478.7 447.8
   Non-CO2 intensive  AGR  -0.8 -1.3 -1.9 166.6 155.2 58.8 166.4 362.8 471.5
 SER  0.0 0.1 0.1 324.6 363.8 414.7 318.8 462.0 568.4
 NCIE  5.7 7.7 12.3 458.0 481.3 338.5 181.2 700.6 1455.5
Investments in  
physical capital 
 
0.9 1.3 1.7 38.7 88.8 126.0 38.6 42.7 51.4
Exports of goods    -0.8 -1.5 -2.4 0.3 -6.3 -41.3 29.7 57.2 74.1
Imports of goods    -0.6 -1.0 -1.5 3.4 9.6 3.0 31.0 56.0 70.0
Foreign investment    0.7 1.1 1.2 12.8 52.5 79.2 38.2 43.2 51.5
Shadow price of CO2 CI  2.8 2.8 2.8 18.6 18.6 18.6
emissions NCI  0.1 0.1 0.1 9.3 9.3 9.3
Subsidy on investments   CI  -0.50 -0.50 -0.50 0.62 0.62 0.62
in knowledge capital  NCI  0.48 0.48 0.48 0.53 0.53 0.53
Notes: Shadow prices of CO2 emissions are in €/t CO2. AGR is agriculture, IND is CO2-intensive industry, TT is the trade and transport sector, SER is non-CO2 
intensive industry and services, NRG is the energy sector, CIE is CO2-intensive electricity and NCIE is non-CO2 intensive electricity. CI refers to CO2-intensive 
sectors and NCI to non-CO2 intensive sectors.     34
Table 3: Piecemeal sensitivity analysis 
  Discounted utility    Cost-effective differentiation of instruments 
  Simulation   Simulation 
  1 2 3    1 2 3   
  U   U   U     - 
EME M
CI NCI pp -  CI NCI s s   - 
EME M
CI NCI pp   -  CI NCI s s  
Regular  simulation  1.00 1.00 1.00    1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
H δ    low  1.00 0.99 0.97    0.53 1.09 0.88 1.00 
H δ    high  1.00 1.01 1.02    1.00 0.92 1.09 1.00 
ξ       low  1.00 0.95 0.93    1.00 0.91 0.90 1.11 
ξ       high  1.00 1.09 1.13    1.00 1.09 1.16 0.78 
ξ   uniform  1.00 0.99 1.00    0.69 1.52 0.92 0.89 
H σ    low  1.00 0.96 0.94    1.00 0.88 0.94 1.33 
H σ    high  1.00 1.05 1.07    1.00 1.31 1.02 0.67 
Notes: All numbers are indexed to the regular simulation. Results in simulation 1 are robust at the 1 percent precision level. 
Simulation 1 refers to differentiated CO2-emission constraints; simulation 2 to differentiated R&D subsidies; simulation 3 to 
combinations of differentiated CO2-emission constraints and differentiated R&D subsidies. Low and high refer to 25 percent 
lower and higher parameter values than in the regular simulation and uniform refers to positive feedback in technical change 
being specified to operate across sectors. U denotes discounted utility, p
EM denotes the shadow price of CO2 emissions and s 
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Figure 1: Effects of differentiated CO2-emission constraints on discounted utility 
 
   
Notes: CO2 emissions in the CO2-intensive sectors change to the extent that overall CO2 emissions in production are 
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Figure 2: Effects of differentiated R&D subsidies on discounted utility 
 
 
Notes: CO2 emissions in the CO2-intensive sectors change to the extent that overall CO2 emissions in production are reduced 
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Figure 3: Effects of cost-effective set of differentiated CO2 emission constraints and differentiated 
R&D subsidies on discounted utility 
 
 
Notes: CO2 emissions in the CO2-intensive sectors change to the extent that overall CO2 emissions in production are 
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